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Abstract:
This paper presents a framework of the
determinants analysis of the control of interorganizational
relationships (IOR). While drawing on transaction cost
analysis and resource-dependency theory, the authors
analyze the effects of asset specificity, environmental
uncertainty, level of dependence and trust on coordination
costs of IOR. The explanatory power of the framework is
assessed by a case study of buyer-supplier relationships from
manufacturing industry in China. The findings from the case
study suggest asset specificity, environmental uncertainty,
and trust are the main determinants influencing coordination
costs of buyer in IOR.
Keywords: Collaborative commerce, Interorganizational
relationship, Coordination cost.

I. Introduction
Interorganizational relationships (IORs) are hybrid
organizational forms which contain elements of both
markets and hierarchies. Market exchanges are transactions
between
separate
organizations,
and
hierarchical
relationships are coordinated among organizations. IORs
coordinate the activities of multiple organizations that are
separate entities but cooperate with each other about their
common concerns [15].
One important characteristic of IORs is cooperation, it
refers to an agreement, relationship or exchange between
two or more actors that is conducted by each of the
participating parties. In past researches, many scholars
highlighted the opportunities for mutual gains as the key
motivation for IORs cooperation, including the gains as
inter-learning, efficiency profitability, competent advantages,
risk-resist ability and scale economic effect [15][10][8]. On
the other hand, some authors have reported high failure rates
of IORs. From a survey of year 1995 of Australia
manufacturing organizations, Williams [15] find that
approximately 38 percent of all respondent firms indicated
that they had at some stage abandoned a cooperative
arrangement, the main reasons being loss of control and lack
of trust followed by the growing coordination cost of the
arrangement. The wish to remain independent and remain
control of their business operation was also the main reason
of the failure.
A second characteristic of IORs can be described as the
interdependence between partners. To create the transaction
Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Electronic Business,
Hong Kong, December 5-9, 2005, pp. 54 - 58.

value of common goals, partners should pool their resources
together as well as determine the division of labor and the
interface of activities between them. The resulting
interdependence between the subtasks the partners agree to
perform subsequently needs to be coordinated across
organizational boundaries to ensure a fit between their points
of contact [5].
Gulati and Singh [7] have stressed the importance of
using coordination for managing task interdependence by
arguing that “concerns about anticipated coordination costs
are particularly salient in alliances, which can entail
significant coordination of activities between partners”. As
the IOR’s tasks become more interdependent and more
uncertain, the need for coordination and decision making
increases. Upon that, successful control of coordination
costs becomes a key point on this cooperation relationship.
This paper develops a framework to analyze the
determents on the control of IORs in China, which is built
on transaction cost analysis (TCA), resource-dependency
theory (RDT) and notions of social control. We explain the
framework from a case study of four buyer-supplier
relationships on the manufacturing industry. Considering the
availability of data, we will investigate the case from the
buyer’s perspective. In respect of the complexity and
difficulty of measure on coordination costs, this paper dose
not try to examine the structure or measurement of
coordination costs. Rather, we will focus on the inner
relation between coordination costs and those influential
factors.
This paper, in the next section, provides an analytic
framework for measuring the determinants on
interorganizational coordination costs from the TCA and
RDT perspectives. Next, to explain the power of the
framework, we employ a case study of buyer-supplier
relationships from manufacturing industry in China. The
paper ends with conclusions and directions for future
researches.

II. Theory and Hypotheses
Detecting determinants on coordination costs of IOR can be
studied from TCA perspective and RDT perspective
respectively. The TCA has focused on the appropriation
concerns in IORs, which originating from pervasive
behavior uncertainty and contracting problems [3][11]. The
basic assumption underlying the TCA perspective is that the
specific governance form is based on an economizing on
transaction costs. As asset specificity becomes substantial,
interdependency is deepened and coordination is needed for
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safeguarding the appropriation concerns.
RDT is a theory rooted in an open system framework, it
focus on the ability that a firm must obtain necessary
resources from external organization to survive prosper. The
premise in RDT is that, firms confronted with an
unpredictable environment will try to establish
interorganizational relationships as a strategic response to
uncertainty. The RDT perspective addresses the importance
of the resources exchanged and the parties’ ability to control
the flow of input- and output resources [4].
When considering the management and control of IORs,
we think the crucial concern is the magnitude of
coordination cost. This paper considers both dimensions
from TCA and RDT as potential determents on coordination
costs. Besides the common premise of uncertainty
dimension, we focus on examination of asset specificity
from TCA as well as other dimensions from RDT and social
theory, including level of dependence and trust.
II.1 Coordination costs
Many researchers argue that the coordination cost outweighs
the benefits that an alliance can provide. How to control the
costs is the key to allow a firm to realize the potential gains
from alliance involvement [2][7]. The problem lies in the
difficulty to measure it, as coordination costs can not be
reflect from financial data. Considering business exchange is
based on contract, Artz and Brush [2] suggest that
coordination costs should be measured through contracting
costs. They argue that IOR creates two types of contracting
costs: the ex ante costs of initially establishing the contract,
and perhaps more significantly, the ex post costs of
periodically renegotiating and adjusting those contracts.
We also adopt the perspective of Artz and Brush and use
the latter type of costs to measure coordination costs
occurred in IOR. Therefore we use a similar approach as that
suggested by Artz and Brush [2] and use the amount of time
a buyer spends preparing for and actually negotiating supply
contracts and the extent of conflict in the negotiation as
indicators of coordination cost. In detail, we consider three
aspects here: the amount of preparing time before
negotiation, actually negotiating time and bargaining
sessions, and the extent of conflict in the negotiations.
II.2 Independent variables and hypotheses
Asset Specificity. Asset specificity refers to physical assets,
production facilities, tools and knowledge tailored to a
specific relationship that cannot be re-deployed for other
purposes without the sacrifice of productive value. When
entering an IOR alliance, participants usually have to invest
on assets with specific use only in this alliance. As regarding
the manufacturing industry, a firm should, which is looking
for appropriate supplier, make great effort on searching and
evaluating the potential partners. This may consume a lot of
capital, labor and time to establish and maintain the
cooperation relationship. Besides, the participants should be
locked in by special production equipment, computer
technology and related interorganizational systems that link
the buyer and supplier production and scheduling activities.
Substantial asset specificity creates bilateral dependence
and may reduce the buyer’s control over supplier. Therefore
the buyer’s coordination costs may rise. Accordingly we
propose:
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H1: In a buyer-supplier alliance, the association between
buyer’s asset specificity and buyer’s coordination costs is
positive.
Uncertainty. According to TCA, uncertainty refers to the
condition of being able to predict relevant contingences
surrounding the transaction. There are two types of
uncertainties. One type is referred as environmental
uncertainty which means circumstance surrounding an
exchange cannot be specified ex ante. Artz and Brush [2]
define environmental uncertainty as the inability to predict
changes in relevant factors surrounding the buyer-supplier
exchange, such as the changes in price of product input and
the demand for end product. Therefore the environmental
uncertainty makes it more difficult for the buyer and the
supplier to negotiate contracts.
Another type of uncertainty is referred as behavioral
uncertainty which means performance cannot be easily
verified ex post. The effect of behavioral uncertainty is a
performance evaluation problem, that is, difficulties in
verifying whether compliance with established agreements
has occurred [6][14].
When anticipated the supplier may have motivation to
behave high behavioral uncertain, the buyer should consume
more time and effort in negotiating contract for safeguard
purpose. Accordingly we propose:
H2a: In a buyer-supplier alliance, the association
between environmental uncertainty and buyer’s coordination
costs is positive.
H2b: In a buyer-supplier alliance, the association
between supplier’s behavioral uncertainty and buyer’s
coordination costs is positive.
Resource-dependency. As RDT provides a holistic
approach with explicit recognition of economic and socialpolitical dimensions of IOR [12], Ratnasingham and Kumar
[13] argue that RDT is concerned with: (1) external forces
such as e-commerce environment within which the dyad
operates, (2) internal organizational dimensions that
structure and shape written policies and procedures, and (3)
trading partners' interactions in their general exchanges.
Similar to the descriptions above, this paper takes the
suggest that these structure arrangement may be embedded
whining socio-political characteristics of dyad, so we use
level of dependency and trust as the dimensions of resource
dependency.
Regarding the level of dependency reflects the extent
that the buyer relying on suppliers for the resources they
cannot produce themselves, so we suggest that:
H3a: The greater the level of buyer’s dependency on
supplier exists, the more coordination costs the buyer should
use.
Sociologist viewed trust as an individual’s confidence in
the intentions and capabilities of a relationship partner and
the belief that a relationship partner would behave as one
hopes. In IOR’s research, Ratnasingham and Kumar [13]
indicate trust as a key factor for successful long term trading
partner relationships, because high extent of trust between
partners can increase cooperation, thus leading to
communication openness and information sharing.
Furthermore, they identified three types of trust existing in
IOR: competence trust, predictability trust and goodwill trust.
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Competence trust emphasizes the trust in trading partners’
skills, technical knowledge. Predictability trust emphasizes
the trust in trading partners’ consistent behaviors that
provide sufficient knowledge for other partners to make
predictions and judgments due to past experiences. Goodwill
trust emphasizes the trust in trading partners’ care, concern
and honesty that allow other partners to further invest in the
cooperation relationships.
Summarily, we can view trust as a very lubricant that can
help mitigate risk and coordinate interactions in business
relationships. Hence, we argue trust may be an important
mechanism to reduce the coordination costs, and suggest:
H3b: The greater the trust between the buyer and the
supplier exists, the less coordination costs the buyer should
use.
The hypotheses are summarized as figure 1.
Asset
specificity

Environmental
uncertainty

Behavioral
uncertainty

H +

H2 +

H2 +

Coordination
costs

Level of
dependence

+
H3

−

Trust

H3

FIGURE 1: Determinants on coordination costs

III.

A Case Study

On purpose of comparative, we select two electronic firms
and two machine-making firms located at Xiamen city for
in-depth study. These four firms are all stated owned firms
listed on China Stock Exchange.
At first stage, we designed a survey based on buyers’
perspectives of asset specificity, environmental and
behavioral uncertainty, level of dependence on supplier and
trust between the trading partners. Each dimension includes
several items recorded on 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly
agree) Likert scale. Next, we chose the interviewees as the
managers of purchasing department or managers being
responsible for R&D. Then we sent the surveys to
interviewees beforehand and asked them to choose a
supplier for certain product. Latter we arranged the
interview with them separately for detailed discussion. The
summary data in this case study is provided in table 1.
The electronic firms are Amoi Electronic Corporation
and ABC Electronic Corporation. AMOI is a multinational
electronic enterprise, which highly focuses on developing
and manufacturing products from telecommunication, digital
video & audio to IT industry. Nowadays Amoi has been an
internationally well-known leading manufacturer and
supplier of mobile phones in China. In 2003, this firm has
employed about 20,000 persons and the total sales reached
850 millions US dollar. The interviewees chose the supplier
producing screens used in mobile telephones.

The other investigated electronic firm is ABC which is
an anonym. ABC is the leading professional manufacturer of
Plastic Film Capacitors in China. Its current total annual
capacity has reached 2.5 billions pieces, which can be
ranked first in China and sixth in the world. The total
employee is less than 2000, and the total sales are about 36
millions US dollar. The interviewees chose the supplier
producing metal materials used in capacitors.
The machine-making firms are Xiamen King Long
United Automotive Industry Corporation (XMKL) and
Xiamen Engineering Machinery Corporation (XMEC).
XMKL has taken up a leading position among domestic
coach manufacturers and has hired 3500 employees with the
total sales reached 542 millions US dollar. The interviewees
chose the supplier producing engines used in coaches.
XMEC is the key enterprise of large scale for producing
wheel loaders of the state. The company had been the
birthplace of the first loader of China. The total employee is
2000, and the sales in 2003 reached 313 millions US dollar.
The interviewees chose the supplier producing diesel
engines used in wheel loaders.
We firstly compare the negotiate session with their own
supplier between the two electronic firms. On average, both
of them respond some extent of complexity in negotiation
with their suppliers. To reach an agreement with suppliers on
contract items, it often requires extensive preparation time
and numerous separate bargaining sessions. This should
belong to drastic competence and homogeneity of products
existing in electronic industry. Therefore, electronic firms
are always tried to strictly control the costs and quality of
their product to gain competitive advantage in the market.
This results tough negotiation with suppliers and increase
the coordination costs of buyers. Investigated data shows
that the two electronic firms received a same mean value of
3.6 on coordination costs. Rather, the average value of
coordination costs for the two machine-making firms is
much less, which is respectively 1.8 and 2.2. Both of the two
firms attribute the relative easy bargaining process with
suppliers to mature market of machinery industry.
Asset specificity. Amoi has gotten a greater value of 3.4
on asset specificity, and the value for ABC is 2.2, which is
separately the max value and min value among the values of
the four firms. The reason is that the supply of screen for
mobile phone demands high customization, while the
material for capacitors is high standardization. The engine
and diesel engine used by two machine-making firms must
comply with national standard, which make the asset
specificity lower. As a whole, higher levels of asset
specificity increase the difficulty the electronic firms
experience in negotiation supply contracts. Although the
coordination costs of ABC do not seem positive to asset
specificity, this may be influenced by environmental
uncertainty which increase the coordination. However, from
the analytical perspective of industrial difference, this result
can support the positive relationship between asset
specificity and coordination costs.
Environmental uncertainty. As expected, the levels of
environmental uncertainty of electronic firms are obviously
higher than those of machine-making firms. ABC gets the
greatest value of environmental uncertainty, which is not
only two times than those of machinery firms but is also
much greater than the value of anther electronic firm. There
are two causes can explain: first, the market price for
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capacitors usually fluctuate violently. Second, the
investigated component procured by ABC is metal material,
which has been floated frequently in recent years suffered
from international supply. In general, electronic industry
confronted with drastic competence as well as fast
technology innovation. Consequently the product prices and
purchasing costs change frequently, along with the life cycle
of product shorten. Suffering greater environmental
uncertainty than machine-making firms, hence, electronic
firms need more deliberatively negotiate a contract. As a
result, it suggests that higher levels of environmental
uncertainty increase the coordination costs of buyer.
Behavioral uncertainty. Except for the lower value of
Amoi, the levels of behavioral uncertainty of other three
firms are almost the same. On account of the tiny distinction
of these values which is nearly medial value, from this
investigation we cannot get any conclusion on the
relationship
between
behavioral
uncertainty
and
coordination costs.
Level of dependency. Our data reflect that all of the firm
present high levels of resource dependence on their suppliers
for investigate. The primary reason is that the interviewees
of the four firms have happened to choose the focal suppliers
of their core products as investigating object. Among the
firm, the level of dependency of ABC is lesser. Because
there exist many manufacturers can supply metal material, in
the other hand, ABC may find some other substitute if
possible. In general, the distinctions among the levels of
dependency of the four firms are not obviously. As all the
values are distributed between 3 and 4, so the results suggest
that the negative between level of dependency and
coordination costs is not significant.
Trust. From table 1 we can see, the trust between buyers
and their focal suppliers is reached a high level in the range
of 4.29 and 4.57. Considering the greater value of trust
dimension in the case study, we can conclude that all the
four firms have tried to establish strong trusty cooperation
relationships with their focal suppliers. Hence, to some
extent of degree they have reduced the behavioral
uncertainty of their trading partners and make the
negotiation proceeding smoothly. As result, this finding
support for Hypotheses 3b.

IV. Discussion and Conclusion
This paper contributes to focus on the determinants of
coordination costs in IORs by considering the dimensions of
TCA and RDT. Our model indicates that when studying the
control of IOR, the economic dimensions and relational
norms should be putted into consider simultaneously. There
is little empirical study on such topic based on relationships
of Chinese organizations, and this study also makes a
valuable contribution by filling up this gap.
In this study, we investigate four manufacturing firms
located in China belonging to different industry. The result
shows that the Hypotheses 1 and Hypotheses 2a in our
model have been significantly supported by the empirical
data. That means in the context of China, the traditional
TCA research is also useful in study of interorganizational
relationships. We find that both asset specificity and
environmental
uncertainty
directly
increases
the
coordination cost of interorganization exchanges. And this
finding is clearly consistent with previous TCA research [2]
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[1] [9].
As the dimensions of RDT, this study supports
Hypotheses 3b significantly. Therefore this finding indicates
that trust can reduce buyer’s coordination costs by
mitigating behavioral uncertainty. Besides, trust between
trading partners also plays a direct role in reducing buyer’s
coordination costs. On considering the effect of dependency
level, distinction of the investigated data is quite tiny, and
our study does not significantly support Hypotheses 3a. One
possible explanation for this non-significant finding may be
that the dependency level between trading partners in this
study are too similar to manifest the different influential
level.
While the findings of this study provide valuable insights,
several future studies need research into the selection of
determinants of IORs. For instance, our study has provided
insight from the buyer’s perspective, lacking of supplier’s
choice. Since the IORs are bilateral relationships, the
successful control of IOR rely not only the action of the
focal firm, but on actions of all the participants. Therefore,
future research would analyze the determinants from the
supplier’s perspective. Finally, considering the shortage of
case study method, it requires quantitatively methods using a
number of IORs from a wide extent. This also remains an
important challenge for future research into the management
of IORs.
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TABLE.1 Summary data in case study

Firms

Coordination
costs

Asset
specificity

Environmental
uncertainty

Behavioral
uncertainty

Level of resource
dependence

Trust

Amoi

3.6

3.4

2.4

2

3.75

4.29

ABC

3.6

2.2

3

2.75

3

4.43

XMKL

1.8

2.6

1.2

2.75

3.5

4.29

XMEC

2.2

2.4

1.6

2.5

3.25

4.57

